



Mario Tama/Getty Images

2

AMERICAN CITIZENS AND POLITICAL CULTURE

IN YOUR OWN WORDS

After you've read this chapter, you will be able to

- 2.1 Identify the two conflicting origin narratives of the United States as a nation.
- 2.2 Analyze the role of immigration and the meaning of citizenship in U.S. politics.
- 2.3 Explain how shared core values define the United States as a country and a culture.
- 2.4 Describe the competing narratives that drive partisan divisions in American politics.

WHAT'S AT STAKE . . . IN OUR IMMIGRATION POLICY?

Donald Trump opened his campaign for the presidency in 2015 with a dramatic descent down an escalator in Trump Tower, followed by a speech best remembered for the words denouncing immigration: "When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best. . . . They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people." He followed that up by vowing to build a "huge, beautiful wall" between the United States and Mexico, and forcing Mexico to pay for it. By the 2018 midterm elections, he was warning that foreign caravans filled with terrorists and murderers were coming north to "invade our borders."

It's hard to imagine that only eight years ago, immigration reform looked like the biggest no-brainer on earth. The Republicans had lost the 2012 presidential election by almost five million votes, and the powers that be in the party concluded that immigration reform was central to a future presidential win for the party.



Why Is Immigration Reform So Hard to Achieve?

Reforms that would provide undocumented immigrants with a path to citizenship have stalled repeatedly in Congress and present one of the biggest sources of conflict in American politics today. In May 2006, two days after President George W. Bush ordered National Guard soldiers to help beef up border security with Mexico, marchers descended on the National Mall in Washington, D.C., to demand comprehensive immigration reform, including a path to citizenship and a program protecting workers from exploitation in a "Rally for Real Solutions." Sadly, these kinds of real solutions have still not been achieved, over fifteen years later.

Nicholas Kamm/AFP via Getty Images

After all, Mitt Romney had won the votes of only 27 percent of Latinos—a group that was 10 percent of the electorate in 2012 and sure to get bigger. Immigration reform is an important issue to the Latino community, but, unfortunately for the Republican Party, its base rejects any solution other than returning the estimated eleven million undocumented immigrants in the United States to their home countries. To get the presidential nomination, Romney had run so far to the right, talking about something he called "self deportation," that he was never able to find his way back to the middle. The party leadership, meeting after the election to assess the damage, determined that that had to change.¹

Other Republicans, especially business leaders, echoed that message and Democrats were on board too. In June 2013, the Senate, with a bipartisan majority scarcely heard of in these polarized times, passed an extensive immigration reform bill with a vote of 68–32.² The bill provided for tougher border security measures but also for a thirteen-year path to citizenship for those in this country without proper documentation. The ball was in then-Speaker of the House John Boehner's court.

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And there it sat. Any path to citizenship for those who had initially broken the law by their arrival in this country was too much for conservative Republicans who had scuttled Boehner's legislative plans many times before. When limited immigration reform finally came, it was done by President Barack Obama, who took executive action without Congress to single-handedly defer the deportation of young undocumented immigrants who had been brought to this country as small children, and to similarly spare the parents of citizens or legal residents from being deported and to allow them to apply for work permits. In September 2017, the Trump administration canceled the Obama policy, leaving thousands of young people in legal limbo. A year later, in November 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a previous ruling that blocked Trump's action, making it likely that the issue will end up in the Supreme Court.³

In fact, it was as if the Republican angst over the issue had never been. In 2016 and the midterms two years later, the Republican candidates were once again running to the right, vying to outdo each other in their promises to voters that they would remove every undocumented immigrant from the country. Donald Trump affirmed his intention to secure the nation's borders with a "beautiful wall" and was furious with Congress for not including its full cost in their budget. His administration took a harder line on deportations, with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) deporting many long-time residents who did not have documentation.⁴

On the other side, Democrats were once again promising reform with a path to citizenship. When the vote totals were counted in November 2016 and 2018, the Latino vote was again lopsided, helping solidify the partisan division between the more diverse Democratic Party and the whiter, older Republicans. And although the Republican vote was more diverse in 2020 and 2022, the Democrats still drew dramatically more Latino support than did the Republicans.

How had immigration come to be such a toxic issue for Republicans and such a difficult challenge for the country as a whole? How had immigration reform gone from a win-win sure thing to a no-win risk? Had the Republicans changed their minds about the importance of immigration reform, or did they know (or care) that they were committing electoral suicide? Why was there no risk for the Democrats in promising a path to citizenship for undocumented workers? What was at stake for all of these actors in passing—or not passing—immigration reform?

INTRODUCTION


Over the years, American schoolchildren have grown up hearing two conflicting narratives about who we are as a nation. Neither narrative disputes that we are a nation of immigrants, but they tell very different stories about the consequences of immigration. The first, that we are a melting pot, implies that the United States is a vast cauldron into which go many cultures and ethnicities, all of which are boiled down into some sort of homogenized American stew. The other origin story, so to speak, is that we are a multicultural nation in which each individual ethnic and religious identity should be preserved and honored, lest its distinctive nature be lost. The first vision sees the effect of immigration as something that should disappear, leaving only generic "Americans"; the other sees it as worthy of recognition and celebration. We learned in Chapter 1 that being able to get one's preferred narrative accepted is a form of political power, and that is certainly the case with those who are promoting these competing narratives about American diversity. Not surprisingly, reality, as typically happens, falls somewhere between the two extremes.

The rich diversity of the American people is one of the United States' greatest strengths, combining talents, tradition, culture, and custom from every corner of the world. Just to take one example, almost half of the current *Fortune* 500 (*Fortune* magazine's list of the nation's richest companies) were founded by immigrants or their kids. But our diversity has also contributed to some of the nation's deepest conflicts. We cannot possibly understand the drama that is American politics without an in-depth look at *who* the actors are that in many ways shape the *what* and *how* of politics.


Politics—what we want from government and how we try to get it—stems from who we are. Understanding where American citizens have come from and what they have brought with

Snapshot of America: *Who Are We and Who Will We Be by 2060?*

AGE PROJECTIONS, 2020–2060



Percentage of the Total U.S. Population



Behind the Numbers

By 2060, non-Hispanic whites, who easily have been the dominant demographic group, will become a minority. Gains in relative population sizes are evident especially among Hispanics and Asians. Meanwhile, a greater share of the population will be over the age of 64. What will these changes mean for the impact of race and ethnicity and age in American politics? How do you think these changes will impact the role of race and ethnicity on the composition of our two political parties? For elections?

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Demographic Turning Points for the United States: Population Projections for 2020 to 2060," Tables 1 and 3, <https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2020/demo/p25-1144.pdf>.

them, what their lives look like and how they spend their time and money, and what they believe and how they act on those beliefs is critically important to understanding what they choose to fight for politically and how they elect to carry out the fight. As a nation, we have a choice to include those groups with their own stories as valued parts of the national narrative, or to face the tumult of **identity politics**—political conflicts based on the claims of groups who feel their interests are being ignored or undervalued because of who they are. Identity politics includes

not just new immigrant groups but also white Americans whose families have long been here and who see the waves of new immigrants, especially immigrants of color, as threats to their status. In a mediated world, every one of those groups has a chance to speak out and try to create a compelling narrative.

Since we cannot, of course, meet all the Americans out there, we settle for the next best thing: statistics, which provide us with relevant details about a large and complex population. Throughout this book we use statistics, in the form of charts and graphs, to examine the demographic trends that shape our national culture—political and otherwise. We'll use this information not only to understand better who we are but also to consider how the characteristics, habits, and lives of real people relate to the political issues that shape our society.

In this chapter's *Snapshot of America*, you will see that our population is changing. Older people, whose pensions and nursing home care must be funded, compete for scarce resources with younger families, who want better schools and health care for children, and with college students, who want cheaper educations and better terms for their loans and who have a longer term investment in how we care for the environment. The white population in the United States will soon be outnumbered by ethnic and racial minority populations that traditionally support affirmative action, changes in law enforcement, immigration reform, and other social policies (less popular with whites) designed to protect them and raise them up from the lower end of the socioeconomic scale (see *Snapshot of America: Who Are We and Who Will We Be by 2060?*). As a result of these demographic changes, the prospect of becoming a minority population has some whites feeling threatened and fearful about the future of the country, sometimes feeling like strangers in their own towns.⁵ Our population is in constant flux, and every change in the makeup of the people brings a change in what we try to get from government and how we try to get it.

As you look at these depictions of the American people and American life, try to imagine the political complexities that arise from such incredible diversity. How can a single government represent the interests of people with such varied backgrounds, needs, and preferences? How does who we are affect what we want and how we go about getting it?

IN YOUR OWN WORDS

Identify the two conflicting origin narratives of the United States as a nation.

WHO IS AN AMERICAN?

Native-born and naturalized citizens

In Chapter 1 we said that citizenship exacts obligations from individuals and also confers rights on them. We saw that the American concept of citizenship contains both self-interested and public-spirited elements and is challenged in new ways by the mediated lives we live. But citizenship is not only a prescription for how governments ought to treat residents and how those residents ought to act; it is also a very precise legal status. A fundamental element of democracy is not just the careful specification of the rights and obligations of citizenship but also an equally careful legal description of just who is a citizen and how that status can be acquired by immigrants who choose to switch their allegiance to a new country. In this section we look at the legal definition of American citizenship and at the long history of immigration that has shaped our body politic.

Should it be possible to lose one's citizenship under any circumstances?



Seeking the American Dream

Anna Schiachchitano arriving at Ellis Island from Sicily in 1908 with her children Paolo, Mary, and infant Domenico, intending to join Anna's husband, Giovanni Gustozzo, in Scranton, Pennsylvania. Stories similar to theirs fill the family trees of many Americans.

Universal History Archive/UIG via Getty Images

American Citizenship

American citizens are usually born, not made. If you are born in any of the fifty states or in most overseas U.S. territories, such as Puerto Rico or Guam, you are an American citizen, whether your parents are Americans or not and whether they are here legally or not. This follows the principle of international law called *jus soli*, which means literally “the right of the soil.” According to another legal principle, *jus sanguinis* (“the right by blood”), if you are born outside the United States to American parents, you are also an American citizen (or you can become one if you are adopted by American parents). Interestingly, if you are born in the United States but one of your parents holds citizenship in another country, you may be able to hold dual citizenship, depending on that country’s laws. Requirements for U.S. citizenship, particularly as they affect people born outside the country, have changed frequently over time.

Since before its birth America has been attractive to **immigrants**, who are citizens or subjects of another country who come here to live and work. If these immigrants come here legally on permanent resident visas—that is, if they follow the rules and regulations of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)—they may be eligible to apply for citizenship through a process called **naturalization**. Although almost all American citizens have descended from immigrants or were themselves immigrants, they have, ironically, clamored for strict limits on who else can come in behind them (see this chapter’s *The Big Picture*).

Nonimmigrants

Many people who come to the United States do not come as legal permanent residents. The USCIS refers to these people as nonimmigrants. Some arrive seeking **asylum**, or protection. These are political **refugees**, who are allowed into the United States if they face or are threatened with persecution because of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinions. As we see in the continuing debate about whether Syrian and other Muslim refugees from Middle Eastern strife should be allowed into the United States, who can be considered a refugee is very much a political decision, and one that can raise security concerns. The USCIS requires that the fear of persecution be “well founded,” and the agency itself the final judge of a well-founded fear. Refugees may become legal permanent residents after they have lived here continuously for one year (although there are annual limits on the number who may do so). At that time, they can begin accumulating the in-residence time required to become a citizen, if they wish to do so.

Other people who may come to the United States legally but without official permanent resident status include visitors, foreign government officials, students, international representatives, temporary workers, members of foreign media, and exchange visitors. These people are expected to return to their home countries and not take up permanent residence in the United States.

Undocumented immigrants have arrived here by avoiding the USCIS regulations, usually because they would not qualify for one reason or another. Many come as children and may not even know they do not have the proper papers. American laws have become increasingly harsh with respect to undocumented immigrants, but for years that did not stop them from coming in search of a better life. Even before the 2016 election of President Trump, with his harsh anti-immigrant rhetoric, levels of undocumented immigration had actually fallen off, although this fact does not fit well with many of the prevailing narratives about the issue.⁶ In particular, more Mexicans have been leaving the United States, generally to reunite with their families, than have been seeking to enter it.⁷ The COVID pandemic took the issue of immigration out of partisan politics to some extent as health concerns about immigration overrode political agendas.

Even people who are not legal permanent residents of the United States have rights and responsibilities here, just as Americans do when they travel in other countries. The rights that immigrants enjoy are primarily legal protections; they are entitled to due process in the courts (guarantee of a fair trial, right to a lawyer, and so on), and the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that it is illegal to discriminate against immigrants in the United States.⁸ Nevertheless, their rights are limited. They cannot, for instance, vote in our national elections (although some communities allow them to vote in local elections⁹) or decide to live here permanently without permission. In addition, immigrants, even legal ones, are subject to the decisions of the USCIS, which is empowered by Congress to exercise authority in immigration matters.

U.S. Immigration Policy

Immigration law is generally made by Congress with the approval of the president. In the wake of September 11, 2001, security issues came to play a central role in deciding who may enter the country, and new legislation took the federal agency tasked with implementing immigration law out of the Department of Justice, where it was located at the time. The new agency, named the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, was placed under the jurisdiction of the newly formed Department of Homeland Security.



Whom to Admit. No country, not even the huge United States, can manage to absorb every impoverished or threatened global resident who wants a better or safer life. Deciding whom to admit is a political decision—like all political decisions, it results in winners and losers. Especially when times are tough, **nativism**, or the belief that the needs of citizens ought to be met before those of immigrants, can take on political force, as it did in Donald Trump’s presidential campaign in 2016. For instance, jobs are just the sort of scarce resource over which political battles are fought. If times are good and unemployment is low, newcomers, who are often willing to do jobs Americans reject in prosperous times, may be welcomed with open arms. When the economy hits hard times, immigration can become a bitter

THE BIG PICTURE:

How Immigration Has Changed the Face of America


Immigration to the United States reflects both historical events outside our borders and policy decisions made within them. Each wave of arrivals triggered public anxiety about changing demographics, prompting policies that limited the number of incoming immigrants and often targeted specific ethnic or racial groups. We may be a nation of immigrants, but immigrants assimilate quickly, often closing the door behind them.

Foreign-Born Population as a Percentage of State Population: 2019



Where Have Immigrants Come From?


Europe Asia Latin America
Africa North America Oceania



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
How Immigrants Fare in Successive Generations



Sources: U.S. Census, American Community Survey, 2019, www.census.gov/acs/www/data/data-tables-and-tools/ranking-tables/; U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Born: 2019 Current Population Survey, <https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2019/demo/foreign-born/cps-2019.html>



Nineteen out of twenty Hispanic children in the United States under the age of 18 were born in the United States and are citizens.





About 45% of Fortune 500 firms were founded by immigrants or their children.

Sources: Pew Research Center, "Latino Children: A Majority Are U.S. Born Offspring of Immigrants," May 28, 2009, www.pewhispanic.org/2009/05/28/ii-the-legal-and-generational-status-of-hispanic-children/; Ivan DeLuce, "There's a Record Number of Immigrant-Founded Companies on the Fortune 500, Despite Trump-Era Policies," *Business Insider*, August 5, 2019, <https://www.businessinsider.com/immigrants-have-a-huge-role-in-founding-american-startups-2019-8>.


1917 IMMIGRATION ACT:

limited immigration from southern and eastern Europe



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issue among jobless Americans. It's also the case that immigrants, especially the very young and the very old, are large consumers of social services and community resources. Immigrants do contribute to the economy through their labor and their taxes, but because immigrants are distributed disproportionately throughout the population, some areas find their social service systems more burdened than others, and immigration can be a much more controversial issue in places where immigrants settle. In addition, large numbers of immigrants can change the demographic balance, as we have already seen by the fact that whites will be a minority group in this country by 2050. For some people, being a part of the majority is a status and a source of political power worth fighting for. (See *Snapshot of America: What Do Our Two Largest Groups of Immigrants Look Like?*)


Nations typically want to admit immigrants who can do things the country's citizens are unable or unwilling to do. During and after World War II, when the United States wanted to develop a rocket program, German scientists with the necessary expertise were desirable immigrants. At times in our history when our labor force was insufficient for the demands of industrialization and railroad building and when western states wanted larger populations, immigrants were welcomed. Today, immigration law allows for temporary workers to come to work in agriculture when our own labor force falls short or is unwilling to work for low wages. As a rule, however, our official immigration policy expects immigrants to be skilled and financially stable so that they do not become a burden on the American social services system. Remember that politics is about how power and resources are distributed in society; who gets to consume government services is a hotly contested issue.

Regulating the Border. Some areas of the country, particularly those near the Mexico–U.S. border, like Texas and California, have often had serious problems brought on by unregulated immigration. This is one reason undocumented immigration is a hot-button issue. Communities can find themselves

Snapshot of America: What Do Our Two Largest Immigrant Groups Look Like?


Latino Immigrants

33% of Latinos are foreign born. The majority (67%) are born in the United States.



Asian Immigrants

49% of Asians living in the U.S. were born here. The majority (51%) are foreign born.



Behind the Numbers

America is changing. Looking toward the future, we will see growth in the numbers of Asians and Latinos. Will diversity within these groups affect their political cohesion? How will whites, the traditional majority, adapt to their coming minority status?

Sources: Pew Research Center, "Key Facts About U.S. Latinos for National Hispanic Heritage Month," September 9, 2021, <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/09/09/key-facts-about-u-s-latinos-for-national-hispanic-heritage-month/>; and Pew Research Center, "Key Facts About Asian Origin Groups in the U.S.," April 29, 2021, <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/04/29/key-facts-about-asian-origin-groups-in-the-u-s/>.

swamped with new residents, often poor and unskilled. Because their children must be educated and they themselves may be entitled to receive social services, they can pose a significant financial burden on those communities. Some undocumented immigrants work off the books, meaning they do not contribute to the tax base. Furthermore, most income taxes are federal, and federal money is distributed back to states and localities to fund social services based on the population count in the U.S. Census. Since undocumented immigrants are understandably reluctant to come forward to be counted, their communities are typically underfunded in that respect as well.

At the same time, many undocumented immigrants act just like citizens, obeying laws, paying taxes, and sending their children to school. Some have lived here for decades, perhaps since they were children themselves, and their own children and grandchildren may be citizens. They are well

integrated into their communities, which makes the prospect and challenge of finding and repatriating them a formidable one for those who believe that is the best political solution. It is also why many others think providing some sort of amnesty or path to citizenship is more practical.


Whether motivated by cultural stereotypes, global events, or domestic economic circumstances, Americans have decided at times that we have allowed “enough” immigrants to settle here, or that we are admitting too many of the “wrong” kind of immigrants, and we have encouraged politicians to enact restrictions. When this happens, narratives emerge in which immigrants are scapegoated for the nation’s problems and demonized as a threat to American culture. This occurred from 1882 to 1943 with Chinese immigrants and in the late 1800s and early 1900s with southern and eastern Europeans. Legislation in the 1920s limited immigration by creating a quota system that favored the northern and western nationalities, seen as more desirable immigrants.¹⁰ Today’s debate over undocumented immigration taps into some of the same emotions and passions as earlier efforts to limit legal immigration.

Congress abolished the existing immigration quota system in 1965 with the Immigration and Nationality Act. This act doubled the number of people allowed to enter the country, set limits on immigration from the Western Hemisphere, and made it easier for families to join members who had already immigrated. More open borders meant immigration was increasingly hard to control. Reacting to the waves of undocumented immigrants who entered the country in the 1970s and 1980s, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act in 1986, granting amnesty to undocumented immigrants who had entered before 1982 and attempting to tighten controls on those who came after. Although this law included sanctions for those who hired undocumented immigrants, people continued to cross the border illegally from Mexico looking for work. The 1965 act was reformed with the Immigration Act of 1990, which, among other things, admitted even more immigrants. In the 1990s, legislation under President Bill Clinton strengthened the power of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (the precursor to the USCIS).

Immigration Law Today. As we saw in this chapter’s *What’s at Stake . . . ?* feature, the immigration debate has in recent years come to be defined by the tension between two opposing political camps. On the one hand are those who seek to grapple with the issue of the estimated eleven million undocumented immigrants already in this country and the demands of American business for the cheap labor that immigrants provide; on the other hand are those who prioritize the rule of law and believe undocumented immigrants should be sent home and the borders tightened against the arrival of any more. Although under Barack Obama’s administration, deportations of undocumented workers, especially those with criminal backgrounds, rose sharply, Obama tried hard to get Congress to pass immigration reform, especially the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act. This policy would have granted relief to young adults who were brought here without documentation as children. Unwilling to leave the job unfinished, Obama decided to take executive action. In 2012, he announced the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy that allowed children brought in without documentation to apply for a two-year, renewable exemption from deportation during which time they would be eligible for work permits.

By contrast, opposition to undocumented immigration was a cornerstone of both Donald Trump’s campaign and his presidential rhetoric. For many of his supporters, the building of a wall along the southern border was meant to be a visual sign that the United States was serious about cracking down on undocumented entrants, even though it was not clear that a wall had more than symbolic value. Still, Trump made funding the wall and stricter laws on *legal* as well as illegal immigration the price of his support for immigration reform. He said he wanted to limit the number of family members legal immigrants could bring in with them (so-called chain migration) and limit the number of immigrants from what he called “shithole” countries, referring to Haiti and the nations of Africa. Although he initially said he would support the DREAM Act, as we noted in *What’s at Stake . . . ?* he tried to end DACA in 2017. In 2018 the District Court in Washington, D.C., said that the program had to resume taking applications and that ruling was upheld in November.¹¹ As of this writing, DACA stays in place. In June 2020, the Supreme Court held in *Trump v. NAACP* that the reasoning behind the administration’s efforts to eliminate DACA were arbitrary. Under the ruling, DACA was allowed to stand, a policy the Biden administration favors.

MAP 2.1 ■ Sanctuary and Anti-Sanctuary States



Over the objections of the federal government, some states, and many cities and counties, have passed laws limiting local authorities' obligation to cooperate with immigration officials (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or ICE). In reaction, other jurisdictions have passed laws making cooperation with ICE mandatory. The legality of these strong differences among the states and localities will be decided by the courts, or perhaps by Congress if it can manage to put together a comprehensive immigration policy.

Source: Adapted from Jack Herrera, "No One Agrees on the Map of Sanctuary States. We Made One Anyway," *Pacific Standard*, May 3, 2019, <https://psmag.com/social-justice/no-one-agrees-on-the-map-of-sanctuary-states-we-made-one-anyway>.

Some state and local governments resisted the Trump administration's efforts by creating sanctuary cities where local officials do not have to comply with the federal effort to deport undocumented workers. Approximately three hundred states, cities, and local governments have declared themselves to be sanctuaries (see Map 2.1). The Supreme Court made clear in a 2012 Arizona case that although a state was within its rights to require police officers to verify the status of people they had reason to believe were here illegally, it could not infringe on the federal right to set immigration policy.¹² When Trump tried to defund sanctuary cities by executive order, however, several federal judges said such action was unconstitutional. These issues have yet to be untangled by the courts. As we will see in Chapter 4, federalism issues can be very complicated.

Although the reasons for declaring a locality to be a sanctuary city are generally humanitarian, there can be an awareness of economic consequences as well. One Alabama study, for instance, found that in the wake of the passage of a strict immigration bill, 40,000 to 80,000 workers had left the state, reducing demand for goods and services and costing the state between 70,000 and 140,000 jobs.¹³



Support and Defend

An immigrant from Haiti, Alix Schoelcher Idrache earned his citizenship while serving in the Maryland National Guard before being accepted into the nation's most prestigious military school. This photo, capturing his intense emotion during commencement at West Point in 2016, quickly went viral.

U.S. Army Photo by Staff Sgt. Vito T Bryant (West Point)

Pause and Review Who, What, How

There are competing narratives about how immigrants are assimilated into American society—one sees them blending into a melting pot, the other sees a crazy salad of diversity. Which narrative you accept has real implications for your stance on immigration issues, and those issues have high political and humanitarian stakes.

For non-Americans who are threatened or impoverished in their native countries, the stakes are sanctuary, prosperity, and an improved quality of life, which they seek to gain through acquiring asylum or by becoming legal or undocumented immigrants. People who are already American citizens have a stake here as well. At issue is the desire to be sensitive to humanitarian concerns, as well as to fill gaps in the nation's pool of workers and skills, and to meet the needs of current citizens. These often-conflicting goals are turned into law by policymakers in Congress and the White House, and their solutions are implemented by the bureaucracy of the USCIS.

IN YOUR OWN WORDS

Analyze the role of immigration and the meaning of citizenship in U.S. politics.

THE IDEAS THAT UNITE US**A common culture based on shared values**

Making a single nation out of such a diverse people is no easy feat. It has been possible only because, despite all our differences, most Americans have shared some fundamental attitudes and beliefs about how the world works and how it should work. These ideas, our political culture, pull us together and, indeed, provide a framework in which we can also disagree politically without resorting to violence and civil war.

Of course, that statement overlooks the fact that, from 1861 to 1865, the United States was *not* united, as we fought a war that tore the nation apart. The American Civil War happened, in part, because the issue of slavery revealed a fissure in American political culture that had been papered over with the compromises that initially made the republic possible. In the more than one hundred years since the war, we succeeded in repapering over those cracks and acting as a nation but many of the ideas that tore us apart then are becoming visible again as we continue to battle for control over the national narrative.

Political culture refers to the general political orientation or disposition of a nation—the shared values and beliefs about the nature of the political world that give us a common language with which to discuss and debate political ideas. **Values** are ideals or principles that most people agree are important, even if they disagree on exactly how the value—such as “equality” or “freedom”—ought to be defined.

Statements about values and beliefs are not descriptive of how the world actually is, but rather are prescriptive, or **normative**, statements about how the value-holders believe the world ought to be. Our culture consists of deep-seated, collectively held ideas about how life *should* be lived, and these ideas are handed down through the generations—through the process of *political socialization*, which you will read about in Chapter 11. Normative statements aren't true or false but depend for their worth on the arguments that are made to back them up.

We often take our own culture (that is, our common beliefs about how the world should work) so much for granted that we aren't even aware we are doing so. We just think we have the correct outlook and those who live elsewhere are simply mistaken about how things should be done. For that reason, it is often easier to see our own political culture by contrasting it to another's.

Political culture is shared, although certainly some individuals find themselves at odds with it. When we say, “Americans think . . .,” we mean that most Americans hold those views, not that there is unanimous agreement on them. To the extent that we get more polarized—that is, to the extent that our political differences get further apart and the channels through which we get information become more easily manipulated—the political culture itself may begin to break down and we may lose the common language that enables us to settle those differences through conventional political means.

You may have heard the phrase “culture wars” used to describe the political battles that Americans engage in. **Culture wars** are battles not just over how to solve a problem but also over whether and how to define something as a problem in the first place. They are battles about what kind of people we are and what kind of country we live in; they are battles about the narrative we tell about who we are. For example, is child poverty or school violence or the decline of the “traditional family” or an influx of undocumented immigrants a fundamental problem that requires an all-out public effort to solve it? Or are these simply facts of life that we have to put up with in today’s world? Our responses to these questions say a lot not just about what we think is important but also about who we think “we” are.

We toss around the phrase “culture war” casually in political discourse. The 2016 election of Donald Trump—a president who built his brand playing just to his base rather than appealing to the whole nation to stand together—demonstrated the fragility of the cultural ties that bind us. When our differences are stoked and the legitimacy of our system is challenged, we are forcefully reminded that political cultures are neither inevitable nor eternal. Once they are lost, it can signal the loss of national identity and unity as well. If the United States cannot find its way back to shared values, it may instead find its way back to a civil war.

Faith in Rules and Individuals

In Chapter 1 we suggested that the American founders were immersed in a philosophical theory called classical liberalism while they were debating and building the foundations of American politics. Designed in part to undermine and replace the paradigm of the divine right of kings that claimed that people must obey government because it was indistinguishable from the word of God, classical liberalism provided for the opposite. Although the rights and freedoms that citizens possessed were derived from nature, the laws that those rights entitled them to make for themselves were explicitly the product of human beings who could make them because they were rational beings. The determination that people were rational and therefore not dependent on the divine for an understanding of how the world



Free Speech, Even When It’s Ugly

Americans don’t agree on much, but they do cherish their right to disagree. Most citizens have little tolerance for censorship and expect the government to protect even the most offensive speech. Here, white nationalists attend a rally in Shelbyville, Tennessee. Tennessee governor Bill Haslam announced ahead of time that white supremacists were not welcome in Tennessee but said that state and local law enforcement officials would be out “in full force” to respond to any situation that might arise.

Scott Olson/Getty Images

works was the hallmark of Enlightenment thinking, and it opened the door to the scientific method, industrialization, capitalism, democratic self-rule—all so essential to establishing carefully calibrated and defined decision-making processes.

In American political culture, our expectations of government have traditionally focused on rules and processes rather than on results, what we called in Chapter 1 an insistence on **procedural guarantees**. For example, we think government should guarantee a fair playing field but not guarantee equal outcomes for all the players. We also tend to believe that individuals are responsible for their own welfare and that what is good for them is good for society as a whole, a perspective called **individualism**. American culture is not wholly procedural and individualistic—indeed, differences on these matters constitute some of the major partisan divisions in American politics—but these characteristics are more prominent in the United States than they are in most other nations.

To illustrate this point, we can compare American culture to the more social democratic cultures of Scandinavia, such as Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. In many ways, the United States and the countries in Scandinavia are more similar than they are different: they are all capitalist democracies, and they essentially agree that individuals ought to make most of the decisions about their own lives. Recall our comparison of political and economic systems from Chapter 1. The United States and Scandinavia, which reject substantial government control of both the social order and the economy, would all fit into the upper-right quadrant of Figure 1.3, along with other advanced industrial democracies such as Japan and Great Britain.

These countries do differ in some important ways, however. All advanced industrial democracies repudiate the wholehearted substantive guarantees of communism, but the Scandinavian countries have a greater tolerance for substantive economic policy than does the more procedural United States. We explore these differences here in more detail so that we can better understand what American culture supports and what it does not.

Procedural Guarantees. As we have noted, when we say that American political culture is procedural, we mean that Americans generally think government should guarantee fair processes—such as a free market to distribute goods, majority rule to make decisions, and due process to determine guilt and innocence—rather than specific outcomes. The social democratic countries of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, however, as we saw in Chapter 1, believe that government should actively seek to realize the values of equality—perhaps to guarantee a certain quality of life (shelter, jobs, and health) to all citizens or to increase equality of income. Government can then be evaluated by how well it produces those substantive outcomes, not just by how well it guarantees fair processes.

American politics does set some substantive goals for public policy, but Americans are generally more comfortable ensuring that things are done in a fair and proper way, and trusting that the outcomes will be good ones because the rules are fair. Although the American government is involved in social programs and welfare, and it took a step in a substantive direction with passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010, it aims more at helping individuals get on their feet so that they can participate in the market (fair procedures) than at cleaning up slums or eliminating poverty (substantive goals).

Individualism. The individualistic nature of American political culture means that individuals are seen as responsible for their own well-being. This contrasts with a collectivist point of view, which gives government or society some responsibility for individual welfare, and holds that what is good for society may not be the same as what is in the interest of individuals. When Americans are asked by the government to make economic sacrifices, like paying taxes, such requests tend to be unpopular and more modest than in most other countries (even though Americans often give privately, generously, and voluntarily to causes in which they believe). A collective interest that supersedes individual interests is generally invoked in the United States only in times of war or national crisis. People initially responded to the COVID-19 crisis by staying home and protecting each other by wearing masks. But the mask issue was politicized by leaders appealing to our individualistic values, and we soon left our homes, maskless and unvaccinated, in sufficient numbers to cause multiple waves of illness. This echoes the two American notions of self-interested and public-interested citizenship we discussed in Chapter 1.

For contrast, let's look again at the Scandinavian countries, which tend to have more collectivist political cultures. In fact, one reason Scandinavians have more substantive social policies than are

found in the United States is because they have a sense of themselves as a collective whole: to help one is to help all. They value *solidarity*, a sense of group identification and unity that allows them to entertain policies we would not consider. For example, at one time, Sweden used pension funds to help equalize the wages of workers so that more profitable and less profitable industries would be more equal, and society, according to the Swedish view, would be better off. Americans would reject this policy as violating their belief in individualism (and proceduralism, as well).


Core American Values: Democracy, Freedom, and Equality

We can see our American procedural and individualistic perspective when we examine the different meanings of three core American values: democracy, freedom, and equality.

Democracy. Democracy in America, as we have seen, means representative democracy, based on consent and majority rule. Basically, Americans believe democracy should be a procedure to make political decisions, to choose political leaders, and to select policies for the nation. It is seen as a fundamentally just or fair way of making decisions because every individual who cares to participate is heard in the process, and all interests are considered. We don't reject a democratically made decision because it is not fair; it is fair precisely because it is democratically made. In procedural democracies, the various players all participate because they know that according to the rules, even if they don't win today, they can try again and win further on down the road. When people stop feeling that they can win in a democratic system, they either try to change the rules, a procedural solution, or call the legitimacy of the whole thing into question because it didn't produce the result they wanted. When that happens, we are moving from a procedural to a substantive system where people make decisions to achieve specific outcomes they believe to be valuable.

Freedom. Americans also put a high premium on the value of freedom, defined as freedom for the individual from restraint by the state. This view of freedom is procedural in the sense that it provides that no unfair restrictions should be put in the way of your pursuit of what you want, but it does not guarantee you any help in achieving those things. For instance, when Americans say, "We are all free to get a job," we mean that no discriminatory laws or other legal barriers are stopping us from applying for

Snapshot of America: How Much Do We Pay in Taxes?*



Behind the Numbers

No one, anywhere, likes taxes, and most Americans feel their taxes are too high. But notice that our average tax rate is lower than that in most other industrialized countries. What are the tradeoffs in people keeping more of their income versus government having funds to deal with national problems?

Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Revenue Statistics—OECD Countries," <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=REV>.

* Taxes as a percentage of GDP, 2020.

any particular position. A substantive view of freedom would ensure us the training to get a job so that our freedom meant a positive opportunity, not just the absence of restraint.

Americans' commitment to procedural freedom can be seen nowhere so clearly as in the Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees our basic civil liberties, the areas where government cannot interfere with individual action. Those civil liberties include freedom of speech and expression, freedom of belief, freedom of the press, and the right to assemble, just to name a few. (See Chapter 5, "Fundamental American Liberties," for a complete discussion of these rights.)

But Americans also believe in economic freedom, the freedom to participate in the marketplace, to acquire money and property, and to do with those resources pretty much as we please. Americans believe that government should protect our property, not take it away or regulate our use of it too heavily. Our commitment to individualism is apparent here, too. Even if society as a whole would benefit if we paid off the federal debt (the amount our government owes from spending more than it brings in), our individualistic view of economic freedom means that Americans have one of the lowest tax rates in the industrialized world (for a comparison, see *Snapshot of America: How Much Do We Pay in Taxes?*).

Equality. Another central value in American political culture is equality. Of all the values we hold dear, equality is probably the one we cast most clearly in procedural versus substantive terms. Equality in America means government should guarantee equality of treatment, of access, of opportunity, but not equality of result. People should have equal access to run the race, but we don't expect everyone to finish in the same place or indeed to start from the same place. Thus we believe in political equality (one person, one vote) and equality before the law—that the law shouldn't make unreasonable distinctions among people the basis for treating them differently, and that all people should have equal access to the legal system.

One problem the courts have faced is deciding what counts as a reasonable distinction. Can the law justifiably discriminate between—that is, treat differently—men and women, minorities and white Protestants, rich and poor, young and old? When the rules treat people differently, even if the goal is to make them more equal in the long run, many Americans get very upset. Witness the controversy surrounding affirmative action policies in this country. The point of such policies is to allow special opportunities to members of groups that have been discriminated against in the past, to remedy the long-term effects of that discrimination. For many Americans, such policies violate our commitment to procedural solutions. They wonder how treating people unequally can be fair.

Pause and Review Who, What, How To live as a nation, citizens need to share a view of who they are, how they should live, and what their world should be like. If they have no common culture, they fragment and break apart, like the divided peoples of Ireland and the former Yugoslavia. Political cultures provide coherence and national unity to citizens who may be very different in other ways. Americans achieve national unity through a political culture based on procedural and individualistic visions of democracy, freedom, and equality.

IN YOUR OWN WORDS

Explain how shared core values define the United States as a country and a culture.

THE IDEAS THAT DIVIDE US

Differences over how much government control there should be in our lives

Most Americans are united in their commitment at some level to a political culture based on proceduralism and individualism and to the key values of democracy, freedom, and equality. As we have

indicated, however, their commitment on some of these points has begun to waiver under intense polarization. Ideally, this shared political culture can give us a common political language, a way to talk about politics that keeps us united even though we may use that common language to tell different narratives about who we are, what's important to us, and what direction we feel the country should move in. That we do that is not surprising. Although Americans have much in common, there are more than 300 million of us, and the *Snapshots of America* throughout this book demonstrate graphically how dramatically different we are in terms of our religious, educational, geographic, and professional backgrounds. We have different interests, different beliefs, different prejudices, and different hopes and dreams.

With all that diversity, we are bound to have a variety of beliefs and opinions about politics, the economy, and society that help us make sense of our world but that can divide us into opposing camps. These camps, or different belief systems, are called **ideologies**. Again, like the values and beliefs that underlie our culture, our ideologies are based on normative prescriptions—they depend for their force on the arguments we make to defend them. We cannot even pretend to live in a Norman Rockwell world where we learn our values face to face at our parents' dinner table. In a mediated age there are more and more arguments from more and more channels that are harder and harder to sort out. It might seem crystal clear to us that our values are right and true, but to a person who disagrees with our prescriptions, we are as wrong as they think we are. So we debate and argue. In fact, anyone who pays attention to American politics knows that we disagree about many specific political ideas and issues, and that our differences have gotten more passionate and polarized (that is, further apart) in recent years.

But because we still share a political culture, our range of debate in the United States is relatively narrow, compared with the ideological spectrum of many countries. We have no successful communist or socialist parties here, for instance, because the ideologies on which those parties are founded seem to most Americans to push the limits of procedural and individualistic culture too far, especially in the economic realm. The two main ideological camps in the United States are the liberals (associated, since the 1930s, with the Democratic Party) and the conservatives (associated with the Republicans), with many Americans falling somewhere in between. Even though Sen. Bernie Sanders, a self-identified democratic socialist, ran for president in 2016 and 2020, he did it as a Democrat (a party he had joined only briefly, to run), and he lost the nomination both times.

There are lots of different ways to characterize American ideologies. It is conventional to say that **conservatives** tend to promote a political narrative based on traditional social values, distrust of government action except in matters of national security, resistance to change, and the maintenance of a prescribed social order. **Liberals**, in contrast, are understood to tell a narrative based on the potential for progress and change, trust in government, innovations as answers to social problems, and the expansion of individual rights and expression. For a more nuanced understanding of ideology in America, however, we focus on the two main ideological dimensions of economics and social order issues.

The Economic Dimension

Since the Great Depression in the 1930s and Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal (a set of government policies designed to get the economy moving and to protect citizens from the worst effects of the Depression), American conservatives and liberals have diverged on how much they trust government to regulate a market that had demonstrated a marked inability to regulate itself. Conservatives believe that government is not to be trusted with too much power and is not a competent economic actor. Liberals, in contrast, have been willing to trust government more to regulate the economy, arguing that some of the effects of an unregulated market (poverty, hunger, etc.) are substantively unacceptable in a rich, advanced industrial nation. American economic ideological differences are much like those located on our economic continuum in Chapter 1 (see Figure 1.1), although none get anywhere as substantive as those do. Consequently, we say that liberals who advocate a larger role for government in regulating the economy are on the left, and conservatives who think government control should be minimal are on the right.

The Social Order Dimension

In the 1980s and 1990s another ideological dimension became prominent in the United States. Perhaps because, as some researchers have argued, most people are able to meet their basic economic needs and more people than ever before are identifying themselves as middle class, many Americans began to focus less on economic questions and more on issues of morality and quality of life. The new ideological dimension, which is analogous to the social order dimension we discussed in Chapter 1 (see Figure 1.2), divides people on the question of how much government control there should be over the moral and social order—whether government’s role should be limited to protecting individual rights and providing procedural guarantees of equality and due process, or whether the government should be involved in making more substantive judgments about how people should live their lives.

Even though few people in the United States want to go so far as to create a social order that makes all moral and political decisions for its subjects, as we will see, some people hold that it is the government’s job to create and protect some version of a preferred social order. It is once we get below the line distinguishing substantive social values that we get into the territory that starts to fracture the American cultural consensus on a procedural political culture.


The Relationship Between the Two Ideological Dimensions

Clearly this social order ideological dimension does not dovetail neatly with the more traditional liberal and conservative orientations toward government action. Figure 1.3 focused on a small part of the upper-right quadrant we called *advanced industrial democracy*. When you look at the quadrants produced by examining those same dimensions within the United States’ procedural and individualistic political culture, you get four distinct American ideological positions that are more explanatory than simply saying “left” and “right.” Figure 2.1 lays out these positions graphically.

Economic conservatives, in the upper-right quadrant of the figure, are reluctant to allow government interference in people’s private lives or in the economy. With respect to social order issues, they are willing to let government regulate such behaviors as murder, rape, and theft, but they generally believe that social order issues such as reproductive choices, marijuana usage, LGBTQ+ rights, and physician aid in dying are not matters for government regulation. These economic conservatives also prefer government to limit its role in economic decision making to regulation of the market (like changing interest rates and cutting taxes to end recessions), elimination of “unfair” trade practices (like monopolies), and provision of some public goods (like highways and national defense). Economic conservatism is often summed up with the catch phrase: “get government out of the boardroom (economic decisions) and out of the bedroom (decisions concerning personal morality),” or “the government that governs best, governs least.” When it comes to immigration, economic conservatives favor more open border policies since immigrants often work more cheaply and help keep the labor market competitive for business. The most extreme holders of economic conservative views are called **libertarians**, people who believe that only minimal government action in any sphere is acceptable. Consequently, economic conservatives also hold the government accountable for sticking to the constitutional checks and balances that limit its own power.

Economic conservatives generally don’t love government, but they do embrace procedural rules that allow individual lives the maximum amount of freedom. Practically speaking, that means they are committed to the protections in the Constitution and the democratic process that check government power. They often believe that American rights are even more extensive than the ones written down in the Bill of Rights, they endorse checks and balances as a way of limiting government power, and if they fail to win an election, they subscribe to “good-loserism”—waiting to fight again another day rather than trying to change the rules or discredit or subvert the process in order to create a more favorable political environment for themselves. Democracies require that people be good losers sometimes, having confidence that a loss today does not mean a loss forever. Trust in the rules of the game and a willingness to accept the loss is essential to the compromise and cooperation valued by the founders and required by the Constitution. Since the rules of the

FIGURE 2.1 ■ Ideological Beliefs in the United States



game in the United States tend to favor the wealthy and powerful even when they lose an election, good-loserism doesn't entail a lot of sacrifice or risk for many economic conservatives, but it still has stabilizing implications for American democracy.

Economic liberals hold views that fall into the upper-left quadrant of the figure because, while they share their conservative counterparts' maximum procedural commitment to individual freedom in determining how to live their lives, they are willing to allow government to make substantive decisions about the economy. Some economic policies they favor are job training and housing subsidies for the poor, taxation to support social programs, and affirmative action to ensure that *opportunities* for economic success (but not necessarily outcomes) are truly equal. As far as government regulation of individuals' private lives goes, however, these liberals favor a hands-off stance, preferring individuals to have maximum freedom over their noneconomic affairs. They value diversity, expanding rights for people who have historically been left out of the power structure in the American social order—women, minorities, LGBTQ+ people, and immigrants. Their love for their country is tempered by the



“We’ve created a safe, nonjudgmental environment that will leave your child ill-prepared for real life.”

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view that the government should be held to the same strict procedural standard to which individuals are held—laws must be followed, checks and balances adhered to in order to limit government power, and individual rights protected, even when the individuals are citizens of another country.

Even though economic liberals embrace government action to further their goals, they, like economic conservatives, practice good-loserism, prioritizing the Constitution and the democratic process over their policy preferences. That can result in a “two-steps-forward, one-step-back” type of incremental policy change, as the founders had hoped, rather than revolutionary change that could be a shock to the system. Accepting that sometimes they will lose means also accepting that it may take them several runs through the electoral cycle to accomplish their policy goals.

Social conservatives occupy the lower-right quadrant in our ideological scheme. These people share economic conservatives’ views on limited government involvement in the economy, but with less force and commitment and perhaps for different reasons (in fact, following the Great Depression, social conservatives, many of whom were members of the working class, were likely to be New Deal liberals). They may very well support government social programs like Social Security or Medicaid or educational support for those they consider deserving. But their primary concern is with their vision of the moral tone of life, including an emphasis on fundamentalist religious values. These values are demonstrated, for instance, by an insistence on government control of reproductive choices, including the elimination of a woman’s right to end a pregnancy, often without exceptions for rape, incest, or the woman’s health; opposition to LGBTQ+ rights, including the right to marry, to adopt kids, and to be protected at the workplace; and the promotion of religious values and narratives, through public prayer, the public display of religious icons, and the insertion of religious considerations into public education. Social conservatives endorse traditional family roles and reject change or diversity that they see as destructive to the preferred social order.

As we saw in the *What’s at Stake* feature on the divisive ideas behind the battle over border policy, immigration is alarming because it brings into the system people who are different, and it threatens to dilute the majority that keeps the social order in place, something that many social conservatives

believe is being intentionally encouraged by their political opponents in order to replace them in the electorate. Many resent what they view as condemnation by liberal elites of the way they talk about race, gender, ethnicity, and sexual orientation and many believe that they are labeled as racist or sexist, or are accused of not practicing **political correctness** or being “woke” by overly sensitive liberal “snowflakes.” In response to the argument made by many liberals that deep-seated and damaging racism against African Americans and native peoples is built into American political culture and the political system, many social conservatives say that they themselves are the ones being discriminated against for refusing to be politically correct and in some cases for being white and Christian. Even the December practice of business owners choosing to say “Happy Holidays” to those customers whose religious affiliation they may not know has been billed, in media outlets that cater to social conservatives, as a “war on Christmas.” Social conservatives embrace an authoritarian notion of community that emphasizes a hierarchical order (everyone in their proper place) rather than equality for all, so they favor tax laws that benefit married couples where the mom stays home. Since limited government is not valued in this case, a large and powerful state is appreciated as being a sign of strength on the international stage. Patriotism for social conservatives is not a matter of holding the government to the highest procedural standards, as it is for those in the top half of Figure 2.1. Less worried about limiting government power over individual lives, they adopt more of a “my country right or wrong,” “America First” view that sees criticism of the United States as unpatriotic.

Because social conservatism, like social liberalism, as we shall see, falls below the mid-point on the political continuum, it places less value on the processes of democracy to achieve social ends, and more value on achieving those ends in the first place. Social conservatives, because they believe they are substantively right about the proper order of society, are less concerned with the means by which correct policy is arrived at than by the fact that it is achieved. Individual choice through the democratic process and the framework of the Constitution is less important than is following a leader who promises to fulfill their views on the social order. Especially if they feel they have truth on their side, they may feel obligated to refuse to compromise with their opponents, which is also not conducive to democracy. Another reason that social conservatives may be less committed to democratic processes over their policy goals is that they are a shrinking demographic in this country. As their numbers decline, they face the real possibility that they will lose in a majority-rule decision. As such, good-loserism may be costly for them because they are not at all sure that a loss today will be followed by a win tomorrow.

All of this lack of concern for the survival of democracy was on display on January 6, 2021, and the days following when social conservatives insisted vocally that Donald Trump had really won the 2020 presidential election and that Joe Biden had “stolen” it. Even though the courts rejected all of their so-called evidence as false by the courts, they continued to follow Trump’s lead and to push the lie at every opportunity. The effect of this trafficking in disinformation, as we said in Chapter 1, has been to undermine people’s faith in democracy and the electoral process. The “win at any cost” attitude is in character for Trump, as anyone who has followed his career can attest, but for the American public, it violates the procedural norms that are at the heart of our political culture. Not only does it weaken the political culture that holds American democracy together, but it also uses lies about election fraud to legitimate efforts to regulate the electorate through tightening voting restrictions and reducing alternatives to in-person voting. In combination with practices like redrawing congressional districts, prioritizing the appointment of judges sympathetic to their cause, and eliminating immigration of people they think will not support their views, these efforts help social conservatives win in the policy arena even when they don’t have the numbers behind them to form a majority. When you institutionalize making an end-run around democracy to achieve goals that you believe are justified, regardless of whether the designated decision-making processes would produce them, you have left the realm of classical liberalism.

Social liberals, or **progressives** (although some economic liberals also refer to themselves as progressive, just to keep you confused), in the lower-left corner of Figure 2.1, believe not only in a stronger role for government to create social change but also in restructuring the system so that there is no advantage to those who have wealth. This is not the gradual, step-by-step change economic liberals believe can improve the system for everyone, but a more revolutionary philosophy that says that incremental change will never be enough and that those who advocate it are part of the problem for

supporting a classist, unfair system. They often see their political enemies in all three of the other ideologies we have discussed.

Social liberals want climate change addressed immediately, regardless of the cost to business or taxpayers. They believe that solving the climate crisis is a top priority and that, without action on this front, nothing else will ultimately matter. They see objections from corporate interests who oppose the costs of regulation, and from climate deniers who refuse to acknowledge the science of climate change, as efforts to maintain a status quo that is very profitable in the short run but disastrous in the long run. They want to see private health insurance eliminated and preferably the private health care system as well, replaced with a government-run system that holds costs down and prevents what they see as unacceptable profiteering by insurance companies and many health care providers. They want college tuition to be free for all Americans, regardless of income, which requires drastic reform of the higher education system.

The essential tenet of social liberals is that the system is rigged to produce unfair economic and thus political outcomes. For many progressives, the other inequities that liberals want to address—along gender, racial and other lines—are ultimately economic in nature, and if the economic restructuring takes place, those other inequities will disappear.

Fixing the rigged system requires radical system change—sometimes social liberals even use the language of revolution, which does not bode well for the Constitution. Like social conservatives, social liberals have concrete ideas about what they think is right, but they are aware that they face considerable democratic opposition to making those things happen. Because their numbers are small, and they are not particularly wedded to procedural norms, good-loserism is less important to them. Consequently they might blame losses on a rigged electoral system or unfair behavior on the part of their opponents rather than on their inability to attract majority support. But in rejecting democratic outcomes, they are closing in on authoritarian impulses that, like those of social conservatives, run counter to the classical liberal roots of American political culture.


Social liberals also believe that language shapes behavior and action and that care should be taken to ensure that no one is made uncomfortable or hurt or damaged by the language used by others. Not only do social liberals endorse prohibitions against hate speech, but they tend to want to regulate speech in other ways as well, censoring material they perceive as racist or misogynistic or homophobic or that otherwise treats groups of people as unequal or inferior. People who enforce these speech codes are accused by opponents of engaging in authoritarian “wokeness.” The term *woke* was originally used by African Americans to identify people who were aware of the systemic nature of racism, something we will discuss in Chapter 6. It was appropriated by (mostly white) social liberals to refer to people who were in tune with their values generally and has become so overused that it now appears mostly in conservative criticism. But conservatives are not wrong when they argue that policing speech to ensure that it does no social harm runs directly counter to the classical liberalism that has helped shape American political culture. The irony, of course, is that social conservatives are often guilty of the same illiberal efforts to control the content of speech, something that only ideologies in the lower two quadrants of Figure 2.1 can tolerate.

Although they can be very vocal, those in the social liberal ideological quadrant are a relatively small slice of Americans overall. If you think about it, a country whose culture is in the upper-right quadrant (capitalist democracies defined by limited government over individual lives and the economy) is less likely to have a lot of ideological commitment to a narrative that endorses stronger government responsibility for both. The social liberal quadrant doesn’t grab a lot of adherents because it pushes the limits of Americans’ limited government, individualistic political culture. Many economic liberals, however, pick up some of the policy prescriptions of social liberals, such as environmentalism, gun regulation, and political correctness.

Who Fits Where? Ideological Divisions in Contemporary American Politics

Many people, indeed most of us, might find it difficult to identify ourselves as simply “liberal” or “conservative,” because we consider ourselves liberal on some issues, conservative on others. In fact, most Americans fall somewhere in the circle in the middle of Figure 2.1—leaning in one direction or another but not too extreme in any of our beliefs.

Others of us have more pronounced views, and the framework in Figure 2.1 allows us to see how major groups in society might line up if we distinguish between economic and social-moral values. We can see, for instance, the real spatial distances that lie among (1) the religious right, who are very conservative on political and moral issues but who were once part of the coalition of southern blue-collar workers who supported Roosevelt on the New Deal; (2) traditional Republicans, who are very conservative on economic issues but often more libertarian on political and moral issues, wanting government to guarantee procedural fairness and keep the peace, but otherwise to leave them alone; and (3) moderate Republicans, who are far less conservative economically and morally. As we have seen, it can be difficult or impossible for a Republican candidate on the national stage to hold together such an unwieldy coalition. Similarly, the gaps among Democratic Socialists and the Green Party and the Democratic Party shows why those on the left have such a hard time coming together.



Dave Carpenter via Cartoonstock.com

Rise of the Tea Party/Freedom Caucus on the Right. In the summer of 2009, with the nation in economic crisis and the new African American president struggling to pass his signature health care reform in Washington, a wave of populist anger swept the nation. The so-called Tea Party movement (named after the Boston Tea Party rebellion against taxation in 1773) crafted a narrative that was pro-American, anti-corporation, and anti-government (except for programs like Social Security and Medicare, which benefit the Tea Partiers, who tended to be older Americans). Mostly it was angry, fed by emotional appeals of conservative talk show hosts and others, whose narratives took political debate out of the range of logic and analysis and into the world of emotional drama and angry invective. A *New York Times* poll found that Americans who identified as Tea Party supporters were more likely to be Republican, white, married, male, and over forty-five, and to hold views that were more conservative than Republicans generally.¹⁴ In fact, they succeeded in shaking up the Republican Party from 2010 onward, as they supported primary challenges to officeholders who did not share their anti-government ideology. Once in Congress, the new members eventually formed the Freedom Caucus, which is sympathetic to many of the Tea Party values.

As we will see, this shakeup culminated in a rejection of the party establishment in 2016. The election that year signaled a moment of reckoning for a party that had been teetering on the edge of crisis for more than a decade. As establishment candidates fell in the primaries, so too did Tea Party favorites. The split in the party left an opening for the unconventional candidacy of Donald Trump. Much to the dismay of party leaders like Speaker of the House Paul Ryan and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, Trump's candidacy proved to be more about his personality and the anger of his followers than it did about the Republican Party, although in the end most party members fell in line to vote for him.

Even before the rise of the Tea Party, Republican leaders had determined that they would not cede any political victories to President Obama. In an effort that goes beyond ideology and approaches tribalism—or the pure desire to see one's own team win at the expense of the other—Republicans simply blocked everything Obama tried to do. In 2010, then-Senate minority leader Mitch McConnell said that the highest priority the party had was to make Obama a one-term president.¹⁵ The members of Congress elected by the Tea Party wave in 2010 enthusiastically committed to this no-compromise stance toward policymaking, demanding the fulfillment of their wish list and refusing to negotiate with the Democrats or President Obama to get things done. That is, rather than participate in the give-and-take, compromise-oriented procedural narrative of American politics, they held out for substantive policy ends. The Freedom Caucus presented then-Speaker of the House John Boehner with

serious challenges to his leadership, bringing the country to the brink of economic disaster over their refusal to raise the debt ceiling so that the United States could pay its bills in the summer of 2011. In October 2013, they even shut down the federal government for more than two weeks. Eventually their threats to unseat Boehner succeeded. In 2015, with visible relief, he turned over the Speaker's gavel to a reluctant Rep. Paul Ryan and resigned from Congress. Weary from the same battle, Ryan decided to resign the office in 2018.

What has become clear is that many social conservatives are outside the circle that defines mainstream American beliefs, posing a challenge to Republicans who run statewide or nationally because they need to satisfy two divergent constituencies. The late Sen. John McCain discovered this in 2008 when he found himself upstaged by his charismatic vice-presidential running mate, Sarah Palin, and her strong social conservative ideas. Mitt Romney rediscovered it during the Republican primary season in 2012, when Tea Party members supported first Rick Perry, then Newt Gingrich, and then Rick Santorum in their effort to pick anybody but (the too moderate) Romney. And Kevin McCarthy discovered it once again in 2022 and 2023 when he was forced to bargain away to the Freedom caucus most of the power of the House speakership he coveted.

Trump's Appeal to Anti-Establishment Conservatives. The escalating anger of social conservatives who felt inadequately represented by the Republican Party's mainstream came to a peak in the anti-establishment fury displayed in 2016. During that primary season, both Donald Trump and Sen. Ted Cruz competed to address the anger that drove that group. Those voters felt used and betrayed, especially by a party that had promised and failed to defeat Barack Obama, a president they viewed as illegitimate, in part because of Trump's challenge to the president's birth certificate. A mix of populist anger against the economic elite who profited at their expense, nativist anger at the perception that whites seemed to be falling behind while government was reaching out to help people of color, and partisan anger that economic conservative Republicans had been promising them socially conservative accomplishments since the days of President Richard Nixon without delivering, the rage of social conservatives seemed to be one of **authoritarian populism**.

Indeed, social scientists trying to understand the surprising phenomenon of the Trump vote found that one particular characteristic predicted it: a commitment to "authoritarian values."¹⁶ These social scientists have found that some social conservatives, when they feel that proper order and power hierarchy is threatened, either physically or existentially, are attracted to authoritarian narratives that seek to secure the old order by excluding the perceived danger. In the words of one scholar who studies this, the response is, "In case of moral threat, lock down the borders, kick out those who are different, and punish those who are morally deviant."¹⁷ Those who score higher on the authoritarianism scale hold the kind of ideas one would expect from social conservatives seeking to keep faith with a familiar and traditional order—anti-LGBTQ+ sentiment, anti-immigration views, even white supremacy and overt racism. Interestingly, most recently it has also corresponded to narratives that reject the idea of political correctness itself, a reaction to the sense that the expression of their fear and anger is not socially acceptable.¹⁸

Because of the authoritarian tendencies of the social conservatives who make up a considerable portion of today's Republican Party, the events of January 6, 2021, were not totally out of character for the American right, even as most Americans watched in stunned horror that such a thing could happen in the United States. In the couple of years since that event, political investigators and analysts have scoured the data and behavior on that day to better understand where the threat to American democracy lies. That the former president retains the support of much of his base and of the right-wing media complex that profits from the angst of that base has complicated those efforts, as anything critical of the impact of that movement can be painted as a partisan attack. But the fact that a major wing of one of the two major parties in the United States has left behind its commitment to classical liberalism, supported an insurrection, and altered voting rules in multiple states to make it easier to subvert the democratic process in the future means that supporters of American democracy and its classical liberal culture need to be clear-sighted about where the threat to it really lies.

The Democrats. The Democratic Party is not immune to pressure from an illiberal contingent who would swing the party in an anti-democratic direction. But so far they have done a better job than


Republicans of containing it, being responsive to some of their policy demands but not putting adherents into positions of power in the party and policing any movement in an authoritarian direction. The majority of the party is ideologically moderate, and candidates who profess progressive views cannot count on replacing their less radical colleagues.

There have been major splits in the Democratic coalition throughout its modern history. The Democrats have to satisfy the party's economic liberals, who are very procedural on most political and moral issues but relatively substantive on economic concerns; the social liberals, substantive on both economic and social issues; and the more middle-of-the-road Democratic groups that are fairly procedural on political and moral issues but not very substantive on economic matters at all. In the late 1960s, the party almost shattered under the weight of anti-Vietnam War sentiment, and in 1972, it moved sharply left, putting it out of the American mainstream. It was President Bill Clinton, as a founder of the now-defunct Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), who in the 1990s helped move his party of liberal Democrats closer to the mainstream from a position that, as we can see in Figure 2.1, was clearly out of alignment with the position taken by most Americans. Compared to those earlier divisions, the Democrats' current intraparty disputes are relatively minor, as the quick resolution to the 2020 Democratic Party nomination showed.

Ironically, in the 2000 election, Al Gore's commitment to the DLC position left him vulnerable to attack from Ralph Nader, who, as a representative of the Green Party, came from the lower-left quadrant. This position does not draw huge numbers of supporters, but in an election as close as the one in 2000, it probably drew sufficient support from Gore to cost him the election. In 2004, Democratic candidate John Kerry did not have to worry as much about appealing to voters in that lower-left quadrant since many of them disliked George W. Bush so much that they were willing to vote for a candidate with whom they did not completely agree in order to try to oust Bush from office. Democrat Barack Obama had the same advantage in 2008, drawing support from across his party's ideological spectrum in large part because of Bush's deep unpopularity. When the Occupy movement rose on the president's left flank in 2011, Obama was quick to adopt some of the movement's anti-Wall Street, anti-inequality rhetoric and made it a central part of his campaign, helping to ensure that he would not face an intraparty challenge from the left. Similarly, in response to the primary challenge from democratic socialist Bernie Sanders, Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden, in turn, moved to adopt more substantive economic positions. The Democrats have been able to manage the ideological dissension in their ranks more easily than have Republicans, for whom the challenge is more fundamental. Still, President Biden has had his hands full balancing the demands of the progressive wing of the party with his own less radical preferences and those of his party's moderates. As Biden's popularity declined in the wake of the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, the continued impact of a pandemic that would not quit, rising inflation, and product scarcities caused by pandemic supply chain issues and the war in Ukraine, progressives tried to argue that Biden was unpopular because voters want more radical policies. Between Biden's own political skills, however, and the unparalleled political talents of then-speaker Nancy Pelosi, the Democrats held together and effected a leadership transfer in 2023 which, if not perfect, lacked much of the usual drama that accompanies the Washington stereotype of "Democrats in Disarray."

Where Do You Fit? One of the notable aspects of American ideology is that it often shows generational effects (see Figure 2.2). Although we have to be careful when we say that a given generation begins definitively in a certain year (there is much overlap and evolution between generations), it can be helpful to look for patterns in where people stand in order to understand political trends. We know, for instance, that older white Americans tend to be more ideologically conservative, and because they are reliable voters, they get a lot of media attention. But with researchers gathering public opinion data on younger voters, and with those voters promising to turn out on issues they care about, it's a good idea to look at where millennials and post-millennials fall on the ideological spectrum in Figure 2.2.

Keep in mind that all we can do is talk about generalities here—obviously there will be many, many exceptions to the rule, and you may very well be one of them. But as a group, younger voters, especially the *youngest* voters, tend to be economically and socially liberal—that is, they fall in the left-hand side of Figure 2.2.



Source: 2020 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey, calculated by authors.

Does it matter to the success of a democracy if relatively few people take an active political role (by paying attention, voting, exchanging political views, and the like)?

Pause and Review Who, What, How

Although most Americans share a political culture, deep political differences, underscored and reinforced by the media, can remain about whose view of government should prevail and who should benefit from its actions. These differences have traditionally centered on government's economic role but increasingly also involve views on establishing a preferred social order, and on what the preferred social order should be. In the United States, ideologies generally go by the umbrella labels *liberalism* and *conservatism*, although many differences exist even within these broad perspectives. Ideological conflict can be contentious since what is at stake are fundamental views of what the political world ought to look like and control of the channels that publicize those views. It can be difficult for all the ideological conflict to be contained in a two-party system like ours.

IN YOUR OWN WORDS

Describe the competing narratives that drive partisan divisions in American politics.

WRAPPING IT UP

Let's Revisit: What's at Stake . . . ?

We began this chapter with a look at the political circus surrounding the issue of American immigration reform. After the 2012 election, the Republican leadership determined that they had to pass immigration reform in order to improve their chances with Latino voters. But what had seemed like a slam

dunk for everyone had become too toxic to touch by the 2016 Republican primaries and even more so by the 2018 midterm elections. What was really at stake in American immigration policy?

Part of the problem is that, for the Republican Party, the stakes were mixed. For business leaders, a guest worker program meant affordable labor for jobs Americans were not always willing to do. They argued that undocumented workers came here because there were jobs for them and that policies that punished employers for hiring them benefited no one and damaged the economy.

For Republican Party leaders, passing reform meant getting a difficult issue off the agenda, one that portrayed the party in a divisive, unflattering light and sent a negative message to an important and growing voting bloc. They knew that Latinos were key to carrying the vote in battleground states like Colorado, Nevada, and Florida. Furthermore, they believed that the policies of economic individualism and social conservatism they advocated should be attractive to Latino voters but that, until immigration was off the table, they would not get a hearing.

But many conservatives in the party, particularly the supporters of Donald Trump, were convinced that reform meant giving a pass to law-breakers who would be rewarded for coming here illegally. If you think back to the ideological authoritarianism we discussed earlier, tough economic times and a dwindling white majority are exactly the kinds of threats to the social order that would trigger the slamming of the immigration door and the rejection of outsiders. At its worst, the rhetoric on this side of the argument, with its references to an “illegal invasion,” “third world diseases,” and “access to terrorists,” begins to sound like xenophobia and even racism,¹⁹ part of the reason why the party leadership want to get it behind them. It will be interesting to see if the Republican Party changes its stance with the 2020 defeat of Donald Trump.

For the Democrats, passing immigration reform meant being responsive to one of their core constituencies. For President Obama, in particular, the failure to act meant leaving undone one of his central campaign promises, the major reason he finally used executive action to address the issue. When the Democrats took back control of the White House in 2020, immigration reform was near the top of their list, but with the COVID-19 pandemic to deal with, it wasn't clear how much else of the party's agenda would be successful.

Shortly after the 2012 election, Eliseo Medina, the secretary-treasurer of the Service Employees International Union and a leader of efforts to mobilize Latino voters, said, “The Latino giant is wide awake, cranky and taking names.”²⁰ That has become clearer and clearer with each election since.

CLUES TO CRITICAL THINKING: “THE NEW COLOSSUS”

By Emma Lazarus, 1883

Anyone who has ever taken a literature course knows it is just as important to think critically about elegant prose and poetry as the stories in the daily news. At least a part of this poem is familiar to most Americans—it appears on a plaque on the Statue of Liberty, one of the first glimpses of America for millions of immigrants to the United States arriving at Ellis Island. A gift from France celebrating American freedom (the statue holds a torch and a tablet inscribed “July 4, 1776”), the Statue of Liberty itself was not intended to be a symbol of immigration. Yet it has become so, especially because of the words put in her mouth by this poem. Given the decision to associate this poem with a national monument, we should think about it not only as a work of art but also as a political statement.

Not like the brazen giant of Greek fame,
With conquering limbs astride from land to land;
Here at our sea-washed, sunset gates shall stand
A mighty woman with a torch, whose flame
Is the imprisoned lightning, and her name
Mother of Exiles. From her beacon-hand
Glows world-wide welcome; her mild eyes command
The air-bridged harbor that twin cities frame.

“Keep, ancient lands, your storied pomp!” cries she
 With silent lips. “Give me your tired, your poor,
 Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
 The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
 Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
 I lift my lamp beside the golden door!”

Consider the source and the audience: The poem was written by Emma Lazarus (1849–1887), a Jewish American poet who became particularly interested in immigration after Russian anti-Semitism drove thousands of refugees to America in the late 1880s. She submitted the poem to an auction to fund the building of a pedestal for the Statue of Liberty, a gift from France to the United States, and it was later placed on a plaque inside the pedestal. How might Lazarus’s own feelings have shaped her message? Why would future immigrants seize on those words as a symbol of hope?

Lay out the argument and the underlying values and assumptions: What is Lazarus’s vision of Lady Liberty—does she see her as a symbol of national freedom from oppressive governance by England (signified by the date on the statue’s tablet) or as a symbol of freedom for individuals from repression by other countries? What does she mean by naming the statue “Mother of Exiles”? What “ancient lands” is the statue talking to when she says, “Give me your tired, your poor”? What role of the United States to those displaced from their homelands is suggested by the poem’s words?

Uncover the evidence: Lazarus does not create a political argument here but uses literary techniques to imply that the State of Liberty is a symbol of individual as well as national freedom. By calling her “Mother of Exiles” and having her utter comforting words of compassion and succor, she implies not only that the purpose of the statue is to welcome immigrants but also that such welcome is the policy of the United States. Does she offer anything other than literary skill to back up the claim that this is what the statue symbolizes?

Evaluate the conclusion: Lazarus is clearly offering a glowing “world-wide welcome” to victimized or suffering refugees to come to “the golden door” of America. From what you know about U.S. immigration history, is that an accurate representation of American immigration policy?

Sort out the political significance: Regardless of the political purpose of the French in giving the Statue of Liberty to the United States, or the intention of the American government in accepting it, it has become a near-universal symbol of an open-door immigration policy whereby the United States stands to welcome those immigrants fleeing inhospitable shores. That is due in large part to Lazarus’s words. How has this generous and humane poem created a narrative about how the United States receives immigrants, and how has that narrative shaped expectations and public policy? How does it compare to the reality of Americans’ sentiments about immigration over time?

REVIEW

Introduction

Politics—what we want from government and how we try to get it—stems from who we are. Understanding where American citizens have come from and what they have brought with them is crucial to understanding what they choose to fight for politically and how they elect to carry out the fight.

identity politics (p. 42)

Who Is an American?

Citizenship in the United States is both a concept promising certain rights and responsibilities, and a precise legal status. U.S. immigrants are citizens or subjects of another country who come here to live and work. To become full citizens, they must undergo naturalization by fulfilling requirements designated by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.

Some people come to the United States for other reasons and do not seek permanent residency. In recent years the influx of undocumented immigrants, particularly in the southwestern states, has occupied national debate. Advocates of strict immigration policy complain that undocumented immigrants consume government services without paying taxes. Opponents of these policies support the provision of basic services for people who, like our ancestors, are escaping hardship and hoping for a better future. Congress, with the president's approval, makes immigration law, but these rules change frequently.

naturalization (p. 44)

asylum (p. 45)

refugees (p. 45)

nativism (p. 45)

The Ideas That Unite Us

Americans share common values and beliefs about how the world should work that allow us to be a nation despite our diversity. The American political culture is described as both procedural and individualistic. Because we focus more on fair rules than on the outcomes of those rules, our culture has a procedural nature. In addition, our individualistic nature means that we assume that individuals know what is best for them and that individuals, not government or society, are responsible for their own well-being.

Democracy, freedom, and equality are three central American values. Generally, Americans acknowledge democracy as the most appropriate way to make public decisions. We value freedom for the individual from government restraint, and we value equality of opportunity rather than equality of result.

political culture (p. 52)

values (p. 52)

normative (p. 52)

culture wars (p. 53)

procedural guarantees (p. 54)

individualism (p. 54)

The Ideas That Divide Us

Although the range of ideological debate is fairly narrow in America when compared to other countries, there exists an ideological division among economic liberals, social liberals, economic conservatives, and social conservatives based largely on attitudes toward government control of the economy and of the social order.

America's growing political apathy is well documented, but the country continues to function. Still, many people claim that such apathy may indeed signal a crisis of democracy.

ideologies (p. 57)

conservatives (p. 57)

liberals (p. 57)

economic conservatives (p. 58)

libertarians (p. 58)

economic liberals (p. 59)

social conservatives (p. 60)

political correctness (p. 61)

social liberals (p. 61)

progressives (p. 61)

authoritarian populism (p. 64)

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